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REMOVAL OF INDICTMENTS BY FEDERAL OFFICERS AS AN INVASION OF STATES' RIGHTS
It is the author's belief that the federal government has,
by a gradual process of legislative enactment and judicial
interpretation, usurped many of the rightful prerogatives
which originally belonged to the state governments. It is
the author's purpose in this thesis to trace the gradual development of what he believes to be one phase of this unwarranted assumption of authority. It is an attempt to show the
various stages by which the federal courts have taken jurisdiction of crimes committed by federal officers, under color
of their offices, within the boundaries of and against the
authority of a state sovereignity.
Government within the United States presents many difficulties in conflicts of sovereignties. The instrument by which
these conflicts are regulated is, of course, the Constitution
of the United States. In that instrument are enumerated
the powers granted by the states to the central government.
The distinction between state and federal government is, in
principle, clear, and it is elementary that all powers not
delegated to the latter are retained by the former. Therefore, if the power is not given to the federal government in
the Constitution, expressly or by necessary implication, to
justify the removal of these causes, then the right to try
the causes belongs to the states. There are two clauses in
the Constitution which have a bearing on this problem.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, provides that "Congress shall
have the power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Article III, Section 2, Clause I, provides that
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
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United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority." It is from the interpretation of these
clauses, and from the implications which flow therefrom, that
the rights of the federal government to take jurisdiction of
cases which arise within the state, must flow.
The first act of Congress, under this authority, which authorized the removal of causes, by federal revenue officers,
to the federal courts, when such officers were sued in state
courts for acts done under color of their offices, was the
Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789. This Act was passed
by the first Congress, many members of which had assisted
in framing the Constiution. This, then, would seem to be a
legitimate exercise of the original grant of power. This act,
framed by many of the makers of the Constitution, presumably embodies the spirit of that document, and the ideals
for which it stands. However, this act provides for the removal of civil cases only, and this right is easily seen to flow
from the provisions of the Constitution above quoted. Its
constitutionality was sustained by the case of Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. v. Whitton.' This was the beginning. It was a legal
and a just exercise of a valid grant of power. The first steps
of an invasion of the rights of another are almost invariably
legal and just.
The next step in the development of this doctrine was
taken on February 4, 1815, when an act 2 was passed by
Congress, providing that if any suit or prosecutionshould be
commenced in any state court against any collector, naval
officer, surveyor, inspector, or any other officer, agreeably to
the provisions of this act, or under color thereof, for any act
done or omitted to be done as an officer of the customs, or
for anything done by virtue of the act or under color thereof,
it might be removed before trial into the circuit court of the
United States, provided the act should not apply to any offenses involving corporal punishment. This is the first ampli1 13 Wall. 270 (1871).
2

3 Stat. 198.
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fication of the original doctrine. It extends the classes of
persons to whom the doctrine applies, but this is not the
startling step shown in, or rather, read into this act by the
courts. The words which at once attract attention in this
act are the words "any suit or prosecution which shall be
commenced." If this extends the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to criminal actions begun in state courts against these
officers, then this is a radical and an abrupt step in our development. There is no adjudicated case in the books which
interprets these words, and no criminal prosecution was removed under it by a federal officer. From this purely negative, but none the less valid testimony, it appears that the
authorities then considered that this act authorized the removal of civil suits only. It is unfortunate that there was not
at that time a test of these ambiguous words. Perhaps the
spirit of the times and the temper of the courts was then so
closely connected with the spirit of state independence which
animated the founders of our country, that a halt would have
then been called on this phase of the extension of federal
powers.
This act was intended to be of short duration, but it was
extended by the act of March 3, 1815,' and re-enacted in
1817 for a period of seven years. However, as in the above
act, no criminal prosecutions against federal officers were
removed to federal courts under this act, so we have no
judicial interpretation of the meaning of the words "suit
or prosecution." The negative argument against the interpretation of this phase as "civil suit or criminal prosecution"
is therefore, still valid when raised against this interpretation.
The next act in our series was passed on March 2, 1833.
This was the Force Bill, and was passed under unusual
pressure of events. At that time one of the States had attempted to pass a statute making penal the collection of
3
4

3 Stat., p. 233, § 6.
4 Stat., c. 57, § 3
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duties by United States officers within the State, under the
tariff laws. President Jackson recommended the measure,
and it was passed by a large majority in both houses. The
act itself had three sections. In the first section jurisdiction
of the circuit courts was extended to all cases in law or
equity arising under the revenue laws for which other provisions are not already made by law, and provision was made
to the effect that any revenue officer injured in his person or
property, on account of any act done by him for the protection of the revenue, might maintain a suit for such damages in the circuit court for the district where the wrong-doer
resided. In the second section, property taken or detained
by a revenue officer was declared to be irrepleviable, and
that it should be deemed to be in the custody of the law and
subject only to the orders and decrees of the Federal court
having jurisdiction of the same. Offenders who should dispossess or rescue, or attempt to dispossess or rescue, any
property so taken or detained were to be deemed guilty of
a misdeameanor, and punished as therein directed. Section
three empowered any such revenue officer to remove any
suit or prosecution commenced against them in a state court,
on account of any act done by them for the protection of the
revenue, into the proper circuit court, for trial in the mode
therein prescribed.
A survey of this act will show that the only words in it
which sustain the interpretation that criminal prosecutions
against a federal officer were included under it are the words
"suit or prosecution," which were taken from the similar
acts of this nature previously enacted and treated above. It
is submitted that, even under the particular circumstances
surrounding the enactmen! of this act, this law applies to the
removal of civil cases only: that under it a state indictment
for an offense against the authority of that state could not
be removed from the state court where found into the circuit
court for trial in any form of proceeding, unless the case,
whether a suit at law or in equity, involved some question
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arising under the Constitution, the laws of Congress or
treaties made under their authority. In support of this is
adduced the fact that from the passage of this act, until the
repeal of the section containing the words "suit or prosecution" on July 13, 1866, there was not one case of an indictment, such as was above considered, being removed to a
federal court for trial. In view of the circumstances surrounding the passage of the act, and the general temper of
the times, this argument now carries much more weight than
it did with regard to the other two laws. Also there were
many civil cases removed under the act. A few of these are
Wood v. Matthews,5 Murray v. Patrie,6 Fisk v. The Union
Pacific Railroad Co.,7 and Tod, realtor, v. Fairfield Com.
Pleas.8 Certainly in the presence of the frequent removal
of civil cases, and the clashes then prevalent between state
and federal authorities on revenue matters, if the authorities of that time had considered the provisions of the act
applicable to criminal prosecutions, there would not be a
total absence of such cases from the record. Also in this case,
with the exception of the word "prosecution" there is no
word in the act which would sustain the interpretation that
the act authorizes the removal of criminal prosecutions, and
it contains many expressions utterly repugnant to the theory
that the proceedings to effect the removal of process were
intended to extend to a criminal and indictable offense.
It is at this point, however, that we have the first radical
step in the assumption of authority by the federal government. The provisions of the Act of July 13, 1866,1 relative
to the removal of suits or prosecutions in state courts against
internal revenue officers, provisions re-enacted in Section
643 of the Revised Statutes, are almost identical with those
of the act of 1833, except that in the latter act the adjective
5
6
7
8

2 Blatchf. 370 (1852).
5 Blatchf. 343 (1866).
6 Blatchf. 362 (1869).
15 Ohio St. 377, 387 (1864).
9 14 Stat. 171, § 67.
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((criminal" is inserted before the word "prosecution." Here
we have a direct statement of the legislative intent to permit
the removal of criminal prosecutions against federal officers.
This is the third step of the process by which the powers of
the federal government have been extended and stretched.
In the first, the removal of civil suits was permitted. In the
second, the removal of suits and prosecutions was permitted.
In the third the removal of suits and criminal prosecutions
is permitted. The conclusion, even at this stage of the development, would have startled the framers of the Constitution, as it would have startled the framers of the first act
from which the amazing present development started.
Of course the constitutionality of the act was soon questioned. In the outstanding case of Tennessee v. Davis, °
the act was held to be constitutional. In that case James M.
DaVis was indicted for murder in a state court in Tennessee.
In his petition, duly verified, for the removal of the prosecution to the circuit court of the United States, he stated that,
although indicted for murder, no murder was committed; that
the killing was done in necessary self-defense, to save his own
life; that at the time the alleged act was committed he was,
and still is, an officer of the United States, to wit, a deputy
collector of internal revenue; that the act for which he was
indicted was performed in his own necessary self defense
while engaged in the discharge of his duties as deputy collector, and while acting by and under the authority of the
internal revenue laws of the United States; that what he
did was done under and by right of his said office; that it
was his duty to seize illicit distilleries and the apparatus used
for illicit and unlawful distillation of spirits and that while
so attempting to enforce said laws, as deputy collector as
aforesaid, he was assaulted and fired upon by a number of
armed men, and that in defense of his life he returned the
fire, which was tfie killing mentioned in the indictment. The
record having been returned, in compliance with the writ,
10 100 S. Ct. 257.
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a motion was made to remand the case to the state court.
On the hearing, the judges were divided in opinion and certified three questions to the Supreme Court. The first queried as to whether such an indictment was removable to the
federal courts for trial. The second concerned the manner
of proceeding to be followed, if the first question was answered in the affirmative. The third queried as to whether
the defendant could be tried in the federal courts if no such
procedure were prescribed.
The most important of these questions is, of course, the
first. The importance of that question can hardly be overemphasized. Its answer involves the determination of the
true relationship of the state and the federal governments,
and of the rights of each.
The majority of the Court answered this question in the
affirmative. Certainly the importance of this step justifies
a somewhat extended inquiry into the reasoning on which
the majority based their opinion, as well as the objections
the minority took to that reasoning.
The majority, in answering the first certified question in
the affirmative, based their determination on two principal
arguments. The first of these maintains that this act, in
permitting the removal of such causes, is necessary for the
execution of the functions of the federal government. They
reason thusly, that the federal government has a right to
pass all laws necessary to secure the performance of its governmental functions. But this law is necessary to secure the
proper exercise of governmental functions. Therefore the
federal government was acting within its rights in enacting
this law. In support of the minor proposition, which obviously is the essential step in the argument, the majority argue
that without this right of removal of criminal prosecutions,
that federal officers may be kept from the performance of
their duties by action of the state courts.
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The second of the arguments of the majority is that this
doctrine has been the law of the land for some time, and that
it is endorsed by custom and habit. They mention the laws
above considered, and now interpret, sixty-four years after
the act was passed, the ambiguous terms "suit or prosecution" to mean "suit or criminal prosecution." Obviously, to
make the first authorative interpretation of a doubtful phrase
in a law, and then to base an argument on the fact that that
law has been in existence and so interpreted for many years,
involves in itself a contradiction. The argument presupposes
the basic fact that the law has been certain in meaning for
those years, in order to base an argument on that existence.
And from a dispassionate reading of the history of the predecessors of this act, it would be indeed difficult to sustain such
an interpretation.
After thus disposing of the first certified question by answering it in the affirmative, the majority hold the second
question to be immaterial, and say that the third question
has been answered in the affirmative by answer given to the
first question.
This majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Strong.
There is a vigorous dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Clifford, and concurred in by Mr. Justice Field. This
dissenting opinion maintains that there are three things to
be determined to decide the effectiveness of this act. First,.
did Congress, in passing this legislation, intend to make
criminal suits removable by federal officers? And if they
did, was the act passed sufficient in legal effect to carry out
this intention? And thirdly, if it was sufficient to carry out
that intent, is the act itself constitutional, that is, could they,
in conformity with the Constitution, effectuate this intent?
As to the first question, the dissenting opinion concedes that
such was the intention of Congress. As to the second question, they maintain that the act passed was not sufficient to
give effect to this intention. They maintain that Congress
would have the power to confer criminal jurisdiction on the
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federal courts. But they hold that, to do this, Congress must
first define the crimes and the punishments to be imposed
for them, and the procedure to be followed in their trials.
There are no federal common law crimes in our legal system,
and there is no federal statute making murder within a state
a crime. Therefore the learned judges concluded that the act
passed was not sufficient in law to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts to try these crimes.
Also there are the following conflicts, among others, between federal and state court procedure in these cases: in
the duty of a state prosecutor to prosecute in federal courts;
in the question as to whose is the duty to serve process; as
to whose the duty to furnish a copy of the indictment and
compel the attendance of witnesses; as to which clerk should
ask, before sentence of death, whether or not the defendant
has anything to say why judgment of death should not be
pronounced against him; as to whether juries should or
should not be judges both of the law and the facts; and as
to whether state or federal rules of evidence and procedure
should govern. Because these matters were not determined
by the act, the dissenting judges hold that it is not sufficient
to effectuate the legislative intent.
By the negative answer to the second question, the dissenting judges maintain the act is insufficient to give the
federal courts the jurisdiction they intended to confer upon
them. And since this is thus determined, it did become necessary to consider whether, if the act had been sufficient to
execute the intention of Congress, that act would have been
in conformity with the constitution. From this reasoning,
the dissenting judges answered the three certified questions
in the negative.
It is submitted that the majority opinion begs the question in this, that it confines itself to the consideration of
whether or not Congress could so legislate that the federal
courts would have jurisdiction to try crimes committed within the states, to the exclusion of a consideration of whether

REMOVAL OF INDICTMENTS BY FEDERAL OFFICERS 363

this congressional act is sufficient to give federal courts jurisdiction of crimes committed within the states; and this latter
is, of course, the question here presented for decision. It is
submitted that the minority's analysis of this question is the
correct one, and that the act, as interpreted, is a violation of
the rights of the states in this, that it takes from them jurisdiction to try crimes against them by an insufficient law. It
is further submitted that the reasoning above given in support of the holding of the minority fully supports this position. However it has become a legal maxim that it is authority and not reason that makes the law, and the majority
opinion in this case established the law on the subject. The
removal of indictments against federal officers for acts committed under color of their office, to the federal courts is
thus by law permitted. The next step is an extension of the
officers to whom this doctrine is applicable, and then our
cycle will be complete.
But before we pass on to a consideration of this final step,
there is a statement in the dissenting opinion of this case
which is worthy of attention. It is both a warning and a
prophecy. "Viewed in any light, the proposition to remove
a state indictment for felony, from a state court having jurisdiction of the case, into the Circuit Court, where it is substantially admitted that the prisoner cannot be tried until
Congress shall enact some mode of procedure, approaches so
near to what seems to me both absurd and ridiculous, that I
fear that I shall never be able to comprehend the practical
wisdom which it doubtless contains. Were the object to give
felons an immunity to commit crime, and to provide a way
for their escape from punishment, it seems to me that it
would be difficult to devise any mode more effectual to that
end than the theory embodied in that proposition." (The
italics are mine. If it were possible to use colors in this paper
I would illuminate that statement. For in it is contained a
warning that it would have been well to heed, and a prophecy that in this, our day, has come to truth.)

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

The next step in this gradual assumption of states' rights
by the federal government was taken by Congress. This new
statute- was passed on October 28, 1919. It reads as follows: "The Commissioner, his assistants, agents, and inspectors, and all other officers of the United States, whose duty
it is to enforce criminal laws, shall have all the power and
protection in the enforcement of this chapter or any provisions thereof which is conferred by law for the enforcement
of existing laws relating to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors under the laws of the United States."
This is the legislative step in the progression, and, as in the
case of the previous legislative steps, it is halting and uncertain. To attain to its fullest flower, it had to be correctly
interpreted by the courts in favor of the federal government.
And, as in the preceding steps, this was done only after much
diversity of judicial opinion.
But before we consider the conflicting opinions of the
judiciary on the meaning of the words used in this act, let us
pause to consider the temper of the times in which this act
was passed. In 1919, the country was still overwhelmed
with war hysteria. The spirit of nationalism, already rampant because of the crisis through which the country was
passing, and incited further by skilled propaganda, waxed
stronger than the forces of sober reasoning. The country
was accustomed to passing new legislation, was used to thinking in the medium of vast sums and of vast undertakings,
was hardened to resigning its individual liberties and the
rights of its component states for a common purpose against
a common enemy. The National Prohibition Act was passed,
in this spirit, to abolish liquor, because it induced drunkenness in some, and yet the Act itself was passed by a nation
that was itself drunk-drunk of things stronger than alcohol,
drunk with power, and ambition, and success. Edmund Burke
has said "A people never give up their liberties but under
some delusion." The American people and the American
11

Nat. Prohibition Act, Title II, c. 85, § 28, 41 Stat. 316.

REMOVAL OF INDICTMENTS BY FEDERAL OFFICERS 365

states made this, the greatest of the gifts of their liberties
to the federal government, under a delusion. They were
under a delusion of grandeur.
Here, however, we are concerned with only one aspect of
this monstrous movement. Once prohibition was in effect,
means were sought to secure the enforcement of the provisions of the act at any price. One of the means employed
was the granting of special privileges and of special powers
to officers engaged in the enforcement of that law. The
statute here under consideration was one of those employed
for that purpose. It is worthy of note that even in the
mental condition in which this act was conceived, and under
the circumstances of its passage, that it does not specifically
give prohibition officers indicted in state courts for violations
of state laws, committed under color of their offices, the right
to remove their causes to federal courts. It rested with the
courts to complete the cycle of this particular invasion, by
the federal government, of states' rights, by extending their
interpretation of this act to cover those contingencies.
The interpretation placed on this act by the inferior federal courts was contradictory. In a petition by a prohibition
officer, indicted in a state court for acts committed under
color of his office, for removal of his cause to the federal
courts, there are two points to be considered. The first of
these is a question as to whether or not a'prohibition officer
is a federal officer under the Judiciary Act, Section 33, which
was above considered, giving federal revenue officers the
right of such removal. If that question be answered in the
affirmative, then there is no need to go into the second question. But if it is answered in the negative, then there remains
the further question as to whether such an officer is entitled
to the provisions of that act under the provisions of the National Prohibition Act above quoted.
The first of these questions aroused dissent in the lower
federal courts. The leading case in those courts, in the affirmative in this dispute, is the case of State of Oregon v. Wood,
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et. al., 2 handed down in 1920. It was there held that a
federal revenue officer, indicted in a state court for killing
a man while enforcing the National Prohibition Act, may
remove the proceeding to a federal court under Section 33
of the Judicial Code (Comp. Stat., § 1015), authorizing removal of prosecutions against revenue officers in state courts.
This case held that a prohibition officer was a revenue officer
under this section of the Judiciary Act, irrespective of the
further grant of power in the National Prohibition Act. The
learned judge in this case says: "But beyond this (the National Prohibition Act), it is manifest that this is a revenue
act, as well as a prohibition act, as witness sections 35 and 37
of Title II, and other provisions of the act." These provisions named relate to the incidental tax to be levied upon
the sale of alcohol which is legal under the National Prohibition Act. From this tax, which is only incidental to the
purposes of the Act, the court concludes that the men enforcing the Act are revenue officers. This is the only argument
the learned judge offers in support of his position that a federal officer engaged in the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act is a revenue officer, within the meaning of Section 33 of the Judiciary Act.
In opposition to this opinion is the leading case of Smith
v. Gilliam. 8 This case holds that the incidental receipt of
money by the government or its officers under the National
Prohibition Act does not make it a revenue act, and prohibition officers are not revenue officers, within Section 33 of the
Judiciary Act. The court cites many decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that merely because some revenue
may be received by the federal government as an incident
to the enforcement of a law, that this does not make such a
law a revenue law, where the law was not designed for raising
revenue, but for other clearly designed purposes. That the
National Prohibition Act was primarily designed for pur12

13

268 Fed. 975 (1920).
282 Fed. 628 (1922).
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poses other than the raising of revenue, no one can deny. To
call an act which abolished laws which had brought to the
government hundreds of millions of dollars annually in revenue a revenue law is a marvel of judicial construction from
which this court wisely shrinks.
This diversity of judicial opinion in the lower federal
courts on this question was ruled upon by the Supreme
Court in the case of Maryland v. Soper, 4 handed down in
1925. Tfiis case holds that agents of a federal prohibition
director are, in searching for a still for the purpose of preventing the violation of a federal statute forbidding the making of spirits in any distillery other than one authorized by
law, within the protection of Section 33 of the Judiciary Act,
although the Section does not apply to prohibition officers
when acting as such. Thus the Supreme Cburt distinguishes
between prohibition officers on the basis of the nature of the
acts they were performing when the alleged crime was committed. This distinction was a virtual denial of the privileges
the prohibition officers and those interested in the absolute
enforcement of the 18th Amendment, were seeking. They
were not so much interested in the privileges of a prohibition
officer who had shot a citizen while that officer was engaged
in the collection of revenue, or in the enforcement of the
revenue features of the National Prohibition Act. What they
were interested in was what would happen to an officer who
shot a citizen while that officer was engaged in the enforcement of the prohibiting features of the National Prohibition
Act.
The rights they sought were finally secured by the adjudication of our second question, namely whether the right of
removal was given to prohibition agents under the provisions
of the National Prohibition Act above quoted. However,
these rights were secured only after a struggle, and after a
long dispute in the lower federal courts on this question.
14

270 U. S. 9, 70 L. Ed. 449 (1925).
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Of course the dispute concerns the interpretation to be
placed on the words "shall have all the power and protection . ..which is conferred by law for the enforcement of
existing laws relating to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors under the laws of the United States." The
numerical weight of authority in the lower federal courts
maintained that the right of removal given to revenue officers
when indicted in a state court was a protection within the
meaning of this act, and was therefore given to prohibition
officers under the same circumstances as it was formerly
given to revenue officers. The leading case in the lower federal courts sustaining this interpretation of the act is Com5 The argument of
monwealth of Massachusetts v. Pogan."
the learned District Judge Martin is briefly expressed in his
own words: "Is it (the right of removal) a protection? The
natural meaning of the word would be protection against
resistance or attack when' carrying out their duties; and
there are provisions in the revenue laws to which it might
apply. The danger however, which such officer would incur
in the performance of his duties, if subject to prosecution or
suit in local courts, in perhaps an unfriendly atmosphere or
surroundings, might be very considerable. In the case of
revenue officers it was recognized as sufficiently serious to
require a right of removal of cases against them to the federal courts as a protection to them in the discharge of their
duties. While the question is not free from doubt, and ...
it is unfortunate that the authority to remove should be of
such uncertain character, I think that the right of removal
is a 'protection' to the prohibition agents in the enforcement
of the act, within the meaning of Section 28."
Other cases which sustain this interpretation are State of
Oregon v. Wood et. al.," United States ex rel Asher v. Corn15
16

285 Fed. 668 (1923).
268 Fed. 975 (1920).
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monwealth of Pennsylvania,7 and People of the State of
Illinois v. Moody.'8
The argument denying this interpretation of the law is
very fully and ably discussed by District Judge Walter
Evans, in the case of Smith v. Gilliam. 9 The learned judge
thoroughly considered the powers and'protections possessed
by revenue officers at the time of the passage of the act in
question, and found them to be six:
1. To enter at all times upon the premises of a distiller,
and, if demand for admission was refused, to break into such
premises or a distillery thereon (Section 3177, R. S.), and if
they were hindered or obstructed in this, fines were imposed,
2. To collect taxes by distraint, and, if needful, to make
repeated seizures of property (Section 3187, R. S.),
3. To break into any distillery by force' if refused admission thereto (Section 3276, R. S.),
4. To break up and into the ground on the premises where
any distillery was located (Section 3277, R. S.),
5. To make seizures of property under Sections 3166,
3200, 3453, and 3460, R. S. (Sections 5866, 5922, 6355, and
6363 Comp. Stats,), and,
6. District Judges were authorized to issue search warrants.
The learned judge, after a careful analysis of the language
of the act, and the circumstances of its passing, concludes
that it is these powers and protections that are conferred by
the act on prohibition officers. He maintains that, while a
case should always be removed when authorized by law, a
removal not so authorized should always be refused, and the
previously acquired jurisdiction of the state court should be
respected. And as to the argument that such a right of removal is necessary for the protection of prohibition. officers,
17

293 Fed. 931 (1923).

18
19

9 Fed. (2d) 628 (1925).
Op. cit. supra note 13.
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he maintains that the laws of the United States are supreme,
and protect citizens sued or prosecuted in the state courts
as fully as in the federal courts, whether the plea therein be
self-defense, or one based on conduct made lawful by some
statute of the United States or of the states. After a full
consideration of these matters the learned judge decided
that this right of removal was not granted to prohibition officers by this act.
The dispute over the interpretation of this act by the lower
courts was finally decided by the Supreme Court in the case
of State of Maryland v. Morris A. Soper, District Judge,20
handed down in 1925 by Chief Justice Taft, and concurred
in by the entire court. The court gives scant attention to
the point so strenuously argued in the lower courts. The
arguments presented by Judgs Evans in the case of Smith v.
Gilliam,"' above cited, were not considered in this opinion.
The parts of the opinion material to this point are as follows:
"We have no doubt that the word 'protection' was inserted
for the purpose of giving to officers and persons acting under
the authority of the National Prohibition Act in enforcement
of its provisions, the same protection of a trial in a federal
court of state prosecutions as is accorded to revenue officers
under Section 33 of the Judiciary Act. ... Congress not without reason assumed that the enforcement of the National
Prohibition Act was likely to encounter in some quarters a
lack of sympathy and even obstruction, and sought by making Section 33 applicable to defeat the use of local courts
to embarrass those who might execute it."
It is submitted with reference to this decision of the Supreme Court, that it, in common with the other decisions
of that tribunal concerning prohibition cases, is marked by
an extreme brevity, that is a poor substitute for the full reasoning which accompanies their decisions in ordinary matters. It is further submitted that while the absence of doubt
20

270 U. S. 9, 70 L. Ed. 449 (1925).

21

Op. cit. supra note 13.
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in the mind of the Chief Justice as to the intention of Congress in passing the act, based on his opinion of what their
expectation was of what the fate of the National Prohibition Act would be in certain quarters may be sufficient reasoning to convince the Chief Justice of the truth of the point;
yet it reflects no small amount of discredit on the extensively
reasoned and exhaustively researched opinion of the lower
court, in the case of Smith v. Gilliam 22 where the learned
court came to the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court
seemed to think that neither the reasoning nor the research
was worthy of comment or of refutation. The policy of the
Supreme Court in deciding prohibition cases by simple affirmation or denial of conclusions is admirable in this, that it
presents a decision which is incapable of being misunderstood; but this benefit seems small when this policy casts
upon that tribunal the suspicion that it is determined by
expediency rather than by principle in these most controversial matters. But this, being a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States, finally and decisively settles the dispute. It is authority.
Thus the cycle of our development is complete. First the
state had jurisdiction over all suits brought against persons
within their reach. Then by the first act, passed in 1789,
certain civil suits against officers were removed from them
to the federal courts. Then, in 1815, the number of officers
to whom this right applied was increased, and the doubtful
words "or prosecution" were inserted in the act.
It is submitted that this act did not give the power of
removal of criminal cases to federal officers, because the
grant of power is in itself ambiguous, and because no criminal cases were, in fact, removed under it. From this we
draw the legitimate conclusion that the authorities of that
time interpreted the act as permitting the removal of civil
cases only.
22
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Then, in 1833, the number of persons to whom the act
applied was further increased, and the doubtful words were
left intact.
It is submitted that this act did not permit the removal
of criminal prosecutions any more than did its predecessor,
and for the same reasons, namely, that the removal of civil
cases, and the complete absence of any attempts at the removal of indictments shows that the authorities of that time
considered the act as permitting the removal of civil cases
only.
Then, in 1866, the word "criminal" was inserted before
the word "prosecution," and after a spirited dispute, and in
the face of a strong dissenting opinion, the right of removal
was given to the augmented list of federal officers both in
civil and in criminal cases.
It is submitted that this act was invalid in this, that it
provided for the trial, in the federal courts, of acts which
were not offenses against the federal government; and further, because it did not provide any procedure to be followed
in those trials, which laws of procedure were necessary before
the federal courts could legitimately begin these trials.
Then prohibition officers attempted to bring themselves
within the terms of this act, and appealed to the courts to
place such a judicial interpretation upon their status. After
some dispute this appeal failed.
Then, in 1919, a further act was passed, giving the prohibition agents the "powers and protections" previously possessed by revenue officers. After a long dispute this was interpreted by the courts as permitting prohibition officers to
remove their cases from the state to the federal courts.
It is submitted that the removal of indictments by prohibition agents is neither a power nor a protection within the
meaning of this act; that there were existing at that time
certain well defined powers of revenue officers and protections belonging to them, which were enumerated and grouped
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together in the Federal Statutes, in Volume 6, Comp. Stats.
(1916), pages 6982 to 7407, and in Volume 1 of the supplement to that compilation, pages 1176 to 1305, inclusive, to
which these words, taken in their usual sense, would apply;
that to extend these words to cover any privileges of these
officers not contained under this heading is an unwarranted
invasion of the legislative field by the judiciary. It is further submitted that this act, both by the interpretation of
the words used and by the circumstances which attended
the passing of the act, at least creates a strong doubt that
Congress by it intended to permit the removal by prohibition
agents of indictments from state courts. And it is elementary
that where such a doubt exists, that the previously acquired
state jurisdiction should be respected.
It is submitted that there are the steps of the gradual process of legislative enactment and judicial interpretation by
which the federal government has usurped one of the rightful prerogatives which originally belonged to the state governments. None of these steps is abrupt. Each goes a little
farther than its predecessor, and each is dependent on the
ground gained by the one before it. It is only when we consider the development of this invasion as a whole that we
see what a definite inroad the federal government has made
into the original rights of the states. Is there any doubt that
if this final end were displayed to the original founders of our
government, that they would be astounded at the ultimate
fate of their basic principle of states' rights? For now the
governments of the various states have not the authority to
try nor the power to punish the criminal offenses of a veritable army of occupation in their midst; offenses committed
against the peace and dignity of the states themselves, and
in defiance of their laws. The power has been usurped. The
authority has been taken from them.
This situation is not without parallel in American history.
It bears a striking resemblance to the situation which existed
in the American Colonies shortly before the beginning of the
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American Revolution. There was at that time in the Colonies a large force of men, placed there to enforce the laws
of another sovereignty, that is, of England. For their offences against the sovereignty of the various Colonies, they
were taken from the Colonies to England for trial, as were
any individuals who offered violence to them. This was shortly before the Revolution. It may be profitable to recall that
this condition is listed by almost every historian as one of
the contributing causes of that Revolution.
When the framers of the Constitution met, they did all in
their power to insure that this condition of affairs would
never again arise in the United States. They framed the Constitution, and in it they limited the jurisdiction of the federal
courts strictly. Unfortunately the memories of men are short,
and their foresight is shorter. No generation can adequately
provide against the stupidity and the blindness and the passions of future generations. While the lesson taught by the
interference of the English courts into American jurisdiction
was still fresh in the minds of the people, the Supreme Court,
in the case of Marbury v. Madison 23 held that the federal
jurisdiction could not be extended beyond the strict limits
placed on it in the Constitution, save by an amendment to
the Constitution; that Congress did not have the power to
give original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in other cases
than those described in the Constitution. The lesson was soon
forgotten, however, and by a gradual process of legislative
enactment and judicial interpretation, the federal government has so extended its jurisdiction, and so usurped the
rights of the state governments, that we now have an exact
parallel to the condition which existed before the Revolution,
and which the framers of the government and of its. Constitution tried so desperately to avoid.
In conclusion, let us look briefly into the practical results
of federal intervention into state jurisdiction. It is perhaps
28
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a digression from the strict unity which should mark a thesis,
but it may not be entirely fruitless to point out a few of the
results which flow from an assumption of power that is unwarranted and unjustifiable.
It would be extremely interesting to know exactly the
number of persons killed by prohibition officers since 1919;
the number of officers indicted in state courts for these killings; the number of officers who transferred their cases to
the federal courts; the number of those who actually came
to trial there; and finally the number of those who were finally convicted of the offenses with which they were charged.
Unfortunately, these statistics are not available. However,
we have at hand a very interesting booklet, "Reforming
America With A Shotgun," 2 4 issued by the Association
Against the Prohibition Amendment, which provides interesting estimates, and quotes examlles of isolated cases. We
quote a few of these estimates and cases, condensed to conserve space, as the most acceptable substitute that can be
provided for the statistics which it is impossible to obtain.
The booklet prefaces its cases with the following remarks; 25 "As we shall show, the record of killings by federal
agents includes a sheaf of homicides for which the shooters
have not been prosecuted along ordinary lines. Even where
there have been state enforcement acts, the states' legal machinery for bringing killers to justice has been stopped by
federal intervention. Local officers have been thrust aside.
the defendants have been taken from them under writs of
habeas corpus, and the trials have been held in federal courts.
Generally, United States attorneys, and sometimes special
federal attorneys from Washington, have appeared as counsel for accused agents. The agents have been acquitted, as
a rule.
"The Chicago Tribune on November 11, 1928, listed the
killings of twenty-three citizens for which agents had been
24
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indicted by local grand juries on charges of murder or manslaughter. In every one of these tragedies, the federal courts
intervened with the result that the defendant escaped punishment."
A few of the particular instances of this custom may illustrate the point. Elmer Fulton sold whiskey to dry agents.
(Pilcher, Okla., Aug. 4, 1927.) He was killed in flight, by
an agent who "slipped in the mud as he was firing to warn
Fulton to stop, his gun was discharged as he slipped, and
Fulton was killed." State prosecution was halted by habeas
corpus proceedings, and the agent was discharged by a federal judge.
Lawrence Wengler, a farmer came near a still, which was
surrounded by prohibition agents. (Near Madonna, Md.,
Nov. 19, 1924.) He saw them and ran. They fired warning
shots. These warning shots killed him. Three agents were
indicted by a county grand jury for manslaughter, but they
were acquitted in the federal court.
John Buongore was arrested for bootlegging, in Harve de
Grace, Md., Aug. 1, 1925. "Fubershaw alleged that Buongore reached for his hip pocket and he believed he was reaching for a gun and he shot in self defense, killing Buongore
immediately." There was no statement in the report as to
whether Buongore was armed. Fubershaw was indicted for
murder, the federal court intervened, and he was acquitted.
Lonnie Atwell and two other men were stopped in a liquor
car by two agents. (In Lincoln County, W. Va., in August,
1921.) "The bootleggers began to run and several shots were
fired. Atwell was wounded, and died in a hospital a few hours
later." The agents were indicted, but a jury acquitted them
in a federal court.
Jacob Hanson, a respected citizen of Niagara Falls, N. Y.,
was killed May 6, 1928, when he did not stop his car at the
hail of two revenue officers, not in uniform, and after dark.
Obviously he thought they were bandits. The agents were
indicted for manslaughter in the state court. The New York
World discusses the subsequent proceedings in an editorial
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(April 3, 1929): "Thereupon United States District Attorney Templeton began a series of legal maneuvers on behalf
of the defendants. No shyster lawyer skating on the edge
-of disbarment has gone farther to defeat justice than this
assistant to the attorney general of the United States." After
delays, changes of venue, hung juries, and all of the questionable uses of local prejudice and sharp practices on the part
of the district attorney, the defendants were acquitted in
the federal courts.
F. M. Ferguson, an innocent person, was run down and
killed by a prohibition agent in Huntington, W. Va., Oct. 25,
1926, and the Bureau's latest account shows that nearly
four years later the case against the agent is still pending in
the federal courts.
However, there is nothing to be gained by multiplying
these cases indefinitely. Suffice it to say that these are only
a few of the many instances of the complete recklessness of
human life which marks the activities of the federal prohibition agents. That recklessness is certainly in no small
measure due to their knowledge of their practical immunity
from any consequence of that disregard for human life. Their
government will protect them from the "unfriendly atmosphere or surroundings" of the state courts. And almost certainly from any punishment in any court. Is it any wonder
that they are reckless? In closing, it would be well to call
attention, in the light of present circumstances, to the statement made by Mr. Justice Clifford, in the case of Tennessee
v. Davis,2 in the year 1866: "Were the object to give felons
an immunity to commit crime, and to provide a way for their
escape from punishment, it seems to me that it would be
difficult to devise any mode more effectual to that end than
the theory embodied in that proposition." A warning that
it would have been well to heed, and a prophecy that in this,
our day, has come to truth.
Jokn M. Crimmins.
Notre Dame, Indiana.
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